

**Addendum to the Statement of Cortez A. Cooper III<sup>1</sup>**  
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**Before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission**  
**Chinese Military Modernization and Export Control Regimes**

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This addendum provides a response to the Commissioner's query regarding a general framework for U.S. hedging strategies to prepare for, but not foment, potential Chinese application of growing national power in ways inimical to U.S. interests. I believe this strategy should consist of three major components:

- Multi-lateral regional security initiatives jointly supported by Washington and Beijing
- Strengthened U.S. dominance in several key military realms, specifically anti-submarine warfare, theater missile defenses, and littoral strike capabilities
- Bi-lateral cooperation on energy and space policies and initiatives

Asia-Pacific regional stability and global and regional economic growth have become increasingly linked with China's rising power and influence. Many Chinese strategists follow a "realist" line of reasoning that posits an inevitable reduction of U.S. influence and access in Asia to accommodate China's rise. Altering this "zero-sum," potentially self-realizing stance requires a delicate balancing act—Washington must maintain the physical military presence in Asia that sends a clear message of commitment to the region, but as a component of an inclusive regional security architecture rather than as an exclusive effort to trump a more powerful China. U.S. security initiatives in the region that appear to marginalize the development of mutually beneficial security frameworks in favor of "encirclement" increase the likelihood of a destabilizing security dilemma.

Growing interdependence and cooperation among the different Asian sub-regions has been on the rise, with China playing a significant role in the multi-lateral forums that enable and facilitate this interaction. An Asian defense framework clearly designed to contain China will invite a cold war competition in an area where the competitor lies physically and economically at the center of the contested region. From the likely perspective of regional actors and in line with their continued acceptance of Washington's primary role as arbiter of regional peace and security, the most attractive policy path for most regional actors is one in which China lends its voice to inclusive regional security initiatives, while recognizing and addressing those elements of its national development strategy that drive Beijing's destabilizing development of power projection capabilities.

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The importance of physical presence of U.S. forces in the Pacific must not be underestimated, and regional exercises should openly illustrate rapid surge capabilities. In addition to the force posture initiatives already underway to ensure U.S. rapid response and reassure regional allies, Washington should place priority on programs that hedge against growing Chinese capabilities in certain niche areas—specifically, the U.S. should prioritize anti-submarine warfare, missile defense, and littoral strike programs. While Beijing will view increased capabilities in theater missile defenses as a threat to China's limited deterrence posture, a credible U.S. defense capability is required to address China's missile modernization program. Deployment options should be geared, however, to ameliorate as much as feasible Beijing's perception of increased vulnerability.

U.S. military-to-military contacts in the region are particularly critical in light of China's successful efforts to gain access to ports and facilities in nations astride Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea lanes. Washington's regional mil-to-mil focus should include revitalizing military contacts with Beijing. Whatever the direction of Sino-U.S. cooperation and competition in the future, a more variegated, robust mil-to-mil relationship is needed to minimize the likelihood of miscalculation.

China's approach to energy supply control and Beijing's direct linkage of energy and security policies are major drivers for a military modernization program that seeks power projection capabilities incompatible with equitable growth, prosperity, and balanced power in the region. Cooperate energy initiatives that promote a shift to a more market-oriented approach potentially represent an area where Washington could draw China into closer compliance with normative economic behavior (along with continued pressure to normalize currency policy and intellectual rights protection). This in turn could lead to greater Chinese cooperation in initiatives to reduce the dependency of both nations on imported energy supplies.

Civil space programs represent another avenue for further integrating Beijing into cooperative, rather than competitive, international economic, technological, and security regimes. Because many of the technologies associated with space programs have military application, space cooperation poses risks that mandate careful management of scientific exchange programs. The advantages of gaining greater access to and transparency in Chinese research and development programs, however, outweigh the potential risks.

The recommendations outlined above do not represent a complete re-direction of current U.S. policy. Ensuring that U.S. interests are served in their execution, however, will demand greater commitment to managing the U.S.-China relationship on a number of levels. U.S. officials often cite the relationship's high priority, but the time and treasure devoted to many aspects of Sino-U.S. interaction at times belies the rhetoric. Washington will best ensure Beijing's adherence to promises of a "peaceful rise" through close involvement in evolving regional economic and security venues (such as ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit), increased bi-lateral cooperation in economic and technological initiatives, and continued U.S. superiority in key military capabilities.